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Abstract: This paper develops a calibrated DSGE model for simulating China’s 
monetary policy and macroprudential policy. The empirical results show, first, that the 
interest rate is a better instrument for China’s monetary policy than the required 
reserve ratio when the central bank is solely concerned by the price stability; second, 
that the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio is a very useful macroprudential tool for China’s 
financial stability, and the required reserve ratio could be used as an instrument for 
both objectives. Whether macroprudential policy complements or conflicts with 
monetary policy depends upon the instruments choices of two policies. Our policy 
experiments suggest three combination choices of instruments for China’s monetary 
and macroprudential policies. 
 
Keywords: DSGE Model, Monetary Policy, Macroprudental Policy, China’s Economy 
 
JEL Code:  E52, E61, G18 
  
                                                             
1
 Peter Sinclair is a professor of economics from the Department of Economics, University of Birmingham, UK. 
E-mail: p.j.n.sinclair@bham.ac.uk; or peter.sinclair@bankofengland.co.uk.  
2
 Lixin Sun (corresponding author) is an associate professor of macroeconomics from the Center for Economic 
Research, Shandong University. E-mail: sunlixin@gsm.pku.edu.cn or lxsun@sdu.edu.cn. Address: The Center for 
Economic Research, Shandong University, 27# Shandananlu, Jinan, 250100, P.R.China 
A DSGE Model for China’s Monetary and Macroprudential Policies 
 
1. Introduction 
The Great Recession of 2008-2009 ignited research interests on the systemic risks and 
financial stability, which is the main objective of the macroprudential policy 
implemented by the central bank in most countries, as the price stability to monetary 
policy. This triggers the debate on the interactions and the coordination between 
monetary and macroprudential policies, because two policies could be either 
complements or substitutes, which is a dilemma to the policymakers (Borio et al., 
2002). In this paper, a New Keynesian DSGE model is developed to analyse the 
interdependencies of China’s monetary policy and macroprudential policy. The model 
borrows the spirits of Iacoviello (2005) and Chen et al. (2012) by incorporating a 
banking sector and some unique features of China’s macroeconomic policies.  
  DSGE models are main toolkits employed by the economists to study the 
interactions between monetary and macroprudential policies. Woodford (2010), and 
Curdia and Woodford (2010) discuss the financial instability under Taylor rule by 
using a simple DSGE model. Using DSGE models incorporating financial frictions, 
heterogenous agents and housing for US and Euro Area, Bean et al. (2010), and 
Gertler and Karadi (2009) analyse the interactions between monetary and 
macroprudential policies. Kannan et al. (2009) shows that macroprudential policy is 
helpful to monetary policy in stabilizing the price level in a DSGE model. Angelini et 
al. (2011) find that macroprudential policy complements monetary policy under a 
DSGE model with a banking sector. Glocker and Towbin (2012) investigate the 
circumstances under which reserve requirements are an appropriate instrument for 
price or financial stability by building a small open-economy DSGE model. Quint and 
Rabanal (2013) estimate an open-economy DSGE model for Euro Area to study the 
interdependencies of monetary and macroprudential policies. They find that the 
introduction of a macroprudential rule would help in reducing macroeconomic 
volatility, improving welfare, and partially substituting for the lack of national 
monetary policies. DSGE models are also introduced to simulate China’s monetary 
and macroprudential policies. A successful DSGE model for China’s monetary policy 
was developed by Chen et al. (2012), which captures many special features of China’s 
monetary policy. Ma and Chen (2012) provide a calibrated DSGE model for the 
coordination of China’s macroprudential policy. They find that Friedman’s simple rule 
is also fit for the implementation of China’s macroprudential policy, and a reasonable 
combination of monetary, credit and macroprudential policies can do a good job in 
stabilizing economy and finance. Chen (2013) investigates the effects of monetary 
and macroprudential policies targeting on China’s real estate market.  
Our DSGE model, which follows Iacoviello (2005) and Chen et al. (2012), captures 
many unique characters of China’s monetary and financial systems. We find that the 
required reserve ratio as an important monetary policy tool employed by the PBOC 
over decades could also be a very useful instrument of China’s macroprudential policy, 
and the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio is another good macroprudential tool for China’s 
financial stability. The empirical results show that whether the monetary policy and 
the macroprudential policy are complements or substitutes in China depends upon the 
choice of the policy instruments. Our policy experiments suggest three combination 
choices of instruments for China’s monetary and macroprudential policies. 
  The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines China’s 
monetary policy and financial regulation system. Section 3 describes the DSGE model 
in detail. Section 4 provides the model calibration according to the time series data of 
China’s economy. Section 5 discusses the policy experiments and presents the 
empirical results. Section 6 concludes.  
2. China’s Monetary Policy and Financial Regulation System 
The People’s Bank of China (hereafter PBOC), China’s central bank, did not operate 
as a central bank until September 1983. After ratification on 18 March 1995, the 
PBOC began to implement monetary policy legally as China’s central bank. 
According to The Law of the People's Republic of China on the People's Bank of 
China (1995) “the PBOC shall, under the leadership of the State Council, formulate 
and implement monetary policies and exercise supervision and control over the 
banking industry”. While China’s monetary policy aims primarily to maintain the 
stability of the currency, its government lays down more specific targets, including 
annual GDP growth above 7%, a stable exchange rate, low unemployment, and, it 
appears, an annual inflation rate of 3%.  
  China started to anchor on an intermediate target in the late 1980s. Until 1986, the 
PBOC had no explicit intermediate monetary targets given a centrally-planned 
economic system in China. During the period 1986–1993, currency in circulation and 
banks’ loan portfolio were adopted as intermediate targets. In September 1994, three 
levels of money supply indicators, M0, M1, and M2 were defined and announced. 
Since 1996, the PBOC formally took money supply (monetary targeting) as an 
intermediary target. 
China’s monetary policy also differs from the conventional central banking in 
several other respects, which affect the construction of a DSGE model. First, the 
PBOC controls the retail deposit rate and loan rate besides the policy rate. But the 
marketization of interest rates still has some way to go. Second, the required reserve 
ratio is an important instrument of China’s monetary policy. Third, the PBOC often 
employs non-market regulating orders, such as window guidance and loan quotas, to 
intervene business activities of commercial banks directly (Chen et al. 2012).  
Figure 1 summarizes the general framework of China’s monetary policy.  
Figure 1 the Framework of Monetary Policy in China 
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China’s financial system (Figure 8) consists of a banking sector, financial markets, 
and a nonstandard financial sector. The large banking sector is dominated by the 
big-four state-owned commercial banks, despite the entry and growth of many 
domestic and foreign banks and financial institutions in recent years. China Banking 
Regulatory Commission (CBRC), is the state authorized supervisory body for the 
banking system. It was separated from the PBOC in 2004. Figure 2 shows the deposits 
and loans in the banking sector. Figure 3 shows broad and narrow money in China. 
   Figure 2 Deposits and Loans in the Banking Sector (Unit: Billion RMB) 
 
Source: CEIN (China Economic Information Networks) 
   Figure 3 Broad and Narrow Money in China (Unit: Billion RMB) 
 
Source: CEIN 
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Two stock markets, the Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange, 
were established in 1990.  After two decades’ development, they are still 
underdevelopment and inefficiency in allocating the financial resources because of 
highly speculations and more inside trading, but they are growing in important for 
China’s development. China’s Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), 
established in October 1992, is responsible for regulating the stock markets and the 
still embryonic futures markets. Figure 5 presents the indices of stocks in two stock 
markets. 
Figure 5 Indices of Stocks in Two Stock Markets 
 
Source: CEIN 
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markets the stock exchange trade dominates according to turnover. The whole bond 
market is organized by 2-level custody arrangements. As China’s central Securities 
depository (CSD) for the bond Market, China Government Securities Depository 
Trust & Clearing Co. Ltd, (CGSDTC) takes the responsibility of the General 
Custodian, which is under supervision of the PBOC. Figure 6 presents the proportions 
of the bonds trading in the interbank market. 
      Figure 6 Proportions of the Bonds Trading in Interbank Market 
 
Source: CEIN 
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currencies. On May 18 2005, foreign currency trading was formerly launched in the 
inter-bank foreign exchange market where spot transactions of eight currency pairs 
were conducted
3
. On August 2 2005, the PBOC released a Notice on Expanding 
Designated Banks Forward Purchases and Sales Business and Launching RMB and 
Foreign Currencies Swaps which permits qualified commercial banks to undertake 
RMB and foreign currency swaps. Further, on January 4 2006, the PBOC issued the 
Public Announcement on Further Improving the Inter-Bank Spot Foreign Exchange 
Market (Public Announcement of the PBOC No. 1[2006]), introducing the 
market-maker system and over the counter transactions (OTC transactions) into the 
inter-bank spot foreign exchange market. The foreign exchange markets are regulated 
by the State Administration of Foreign Exchange, which is directed by the PBOC 
(generally, the head of the SAOEF is one of the deputy presidents of the PBOC). 
Figure 7 presents the Evolution of the Exchange Rate of RMB (Chinese Currency) vs. US$ 
Figure 7 Exchange Rates of Chines RMB against US$ 
    
Source: CEIN 
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Figure 8 China’s Monetary and Financial Regulating System 
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China’s insurance markets are also dominated by big state-owned insurance 
corporations, which are regulated by China Insurance Regulatory Commission (CIRC). 
The PBOC, CRBC, CSRC, and CIRC are parallel regulators under the State Council, 
China’s central government, although the PBOC is authorized to oversight the monetary 
and financial stabilities.   
 
3. The Model 
Following Iacoviello (2005) and Chen et al. (2012), our model economy consists of 
heterogeneous households including savers (patient households) and borrowers (impatient 
households), entrepreneurs, firms, a banking sector, a central bank and government. 
Monetary authority (central bank, PBOC) is responsible for conducting the monetary 
policy and the macroprudential policy. Government (fiscal authority) implements a 
balance budget policy (Ricardian equivalence is assumed to hold.)  
3.1 Households 
3.1.1 Savers 
The agent of the saving (patient) households maximizes the present value of the stream of 
utilities in an infinite horizon:  
1
0
0
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. (ln ln ),
1
s
t s t
s t N
t
s
t
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




 
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               (1) 
where s
tc  denotes the real consumption of the savers at time t , s  denotes the 
subjective discount factor of savers, 
s
tN  denotes the services of the accumulated net 
property mainly comprising durable goods and real estate., with its coefficient NA ; 
s
tH  
denotes the labour hours provided by the savers,   is labour supply aversion coefficient.  
The budget constraint faced by the savers is 
s
1 1( / ) . ,
s s s d s s
t t t t t t t t t t tc q N d w H R d T Div                (2) 
where tq  represents the real price of the services from the net property; td  represents 
the deposits of the savers in the commercial banks, d
tR  is the gross interest rate of 
deposit; /s st t tw W P  is real wage; 
s
tT  is the lump sum tax paid to the government by 
the savers; .stDiv  is the dividend from the commercial banks and retailers. 
The first order conditions are 
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Equation (3) is Euler equation, equation (4) is a labour supply equation, and equation (5) 
shows the dynamic evolution of the asset price. 
3.1.2 Borrowers 
Borrowers (impatient households) borrow money from commercial banks to smooth their 
consumption. Their problem is given by  
1
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where the terms for borrowers with superscript b  have similar meaning as for savers. 
t  represents a shock to net property following an AR(1) process. 
The budget constraints satisfies 
b 2
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with a borrowing constraint:  
     1 1 1[ ]
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where b
tb  denotes the loans obtained by the borrowers from the commercial banks;
l
tR
denotes the lending interest rate; the last term 
b on the right hand of equation (7) 
denotes the property adjustment costs. b
tv  is a time-varying loan-to-value ratio, which is a 
key instrument for China’s macroprudential policy.  
The FOCs are: 
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where b
t  denotes the multiplier on the borrowing constraint (8). 
3.1.3 Entrepreneurs 
The entrepreneurs produce intermediate goods by using a Cobb Douglass production 
function. Following Iacoviello (2205), the problem of the entrepreneur is given by 
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  Subject to the following budget constraints: 
  Production function:  
         
( 1 ) ( 1 ) ( 1 )
1( ) ( ) ( )
E s b
t t t t t tY A K N H H
           
                   (13) 
  Capital accumulation: 
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where the last term in the right hand of equation (15) denotes the capital installation 
costs; E
tb  represents the loans borrowed by the entrepreneurs,   represents the 
depreciation rate of the capital; E
tN  denotes the net property owned by the entrepreneurs, 
which could be collateral when they borrow money from the commercial banks. 
The borrowing constraint for the entrepreneurs satisfies 
         1 1[ ]
l E E E
t t t t t t tR b V E q N                            (16) 
where E
tV  is a time-varying loan-to-value ratio for borrowing of the entrepreneurs.  
3.2 Retailers 
Retailers produce the final goods by differentiating the intermediate goods.  
The production function of the final good producer is 
1
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where 
,i tY  denotes the intermediate good provided by the 
thi  intermediate producer 
(Entreprenuer). 
f  is a coefficient governing the mark-up of the costs of the final good 
producer. 
Assuming that the final good producer operates in a perfectly competitive market, so 
the price of its output, tP , and the prices of its inputs, ,i tP , are given exogenously. The 
relationship between these two prices satisfies  
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Profit maximization produces a demand function for the output of the thi  intermediate 
producer 
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  Following Iacoviello (2005), assuming that 1   fraction of retailers can change their 
prices optimally, the optimal price level is denoted by *
tP , other prices keep unchanged, 
then the aggregate price level can be calculated by  
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The above pricing behaviours imply a following Phillips curve: 
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(21) 
3.3 Commercial Banks 
Following Chen et al. (2012), a representative commercial banks manages its loans ( tL ), 
deposits ( tD ), excess reserves ( tE ), and borrowings from the interbank market ( tIB ). 
Therefore its balance sheet is:  
        ( 1 )t t t t tI B R R R D L E                                    (22) 
  where tRRR  denotes the required reserve ratio. 
  The profits of the commercial bank are given by  
        
1 1
1 1
(1 ) (1 ) [(1 ) (1 )]
(1 )D (1 r ) ( ) C ( )
B l e d r
t t t t t t t t t t t
ib
t t t t t t t
r L L r E E r RRR r D
RRR IB IB C E L
 
 
          
      
  (23) 
  where e
tr  is the interest rate for excess reserves; 
r
tr  denotes the interest rate for 
required reserves, ib
tr  denotes the interest rate for interbank borrowing; 
2 2 21(E) ( [(1 ) ]
2
t d t t l t e tC c RRR D c L c E     represents the costs of managing loans, deposits 
and reserves; 2( ) ( )
2
cb
t t tC L L L

   represents the costs of managing the loans to meet the 
loan target cb
tL  set by the central bank. 
  Substituting (22) into (23) produces 
( r ) ( ) [ (1 ) ] ( ) ( )B l ib e ib d r ibt t t t t t t t t t t t t t tr L r r E r RRR r RRR r D C E C L            (24) 
  The problem of the commercial bank is given by 
        
0
0
m a x . t BB t
t
E 


                             (25) 
  yielding the following FOCs: 
        ( ) ,l i b c bt t l t t tr r c L L L                         (26) 
        ,e i bt t e tr r c E                                 (27) 
        2( 1 ) ( 1 )d r i bt t t t t d t tr R R R r R R R r c R R R D     ,      (28) 
  The market interest rate of loans, l
tr , and the market interest rate of deposits, 
d
tr  , are 
connected with the exogenous interest rate of loans and deposits ( ,d cb
tr , 
,l cb
tr , which are 
set by the PBOC ) by two positive time-varying parameters:  
       , , 0 ,l l c bt t t tr r   for any t ,                 (29) 
       , , 0 ,d d c bt t t tr r   for any t .                (30)  
 
3.4 Monetary Authority 
In China, the PBOC is authorized to conduct monetary policy and macroprudential policy 
to ensure monetary stability and financial stability. 
 
3.4.1 Monetary Policy 
China differs sharply from advanced economies in the way monetary policy works. The 
PBOC not only control the policy rate, it also set deposit and lending rates (Chen et al. 
2012). Moreover, the nonmarket instruments, such as window guidance and loan targets, 
are often employed by the PBOC. Finally, the PBOC's favoured instrument is the required 
reserve ratio less used, if at all, in advanced economies. 
  Following Chen et al. (2012), we suggest following rules to simulate the 
implementation of China’s monetary policy: 
  First, a kind of Taylor rule for the interest rate:  
       1 ,
r
t t y t r t tr y r                                      (31) 
  where r
t  denotes a shock from the policy rate.  
  The second rule relates to the deposit rates set by the PBOC: 
, ,
1(1 ) ,
d cb d d d cb
t r t r tr r r                                     (32) 
  Similarly, the PBOC sets the lending rate according to: 
       , ,
1(1 ) ,
l cb l l l cb
t r t r tr r r      
  The fourth rule is the credit target rule, which is given by 
       1( 1 ) ( ) ,
c b c b y c b c b
t l l t l t l tl y l
                            (33) 
  The final rule is for the required reserve ratio, which satisfies 
       1( 1 ) ( ) ,
R y R
t R R R R R R t R R R t R R R tR R R y R R R
                      (34) 
3.4.2 Macroprudential Policy 
We follow other authors
4
 by specifying two macroprudential policy instruments: 
loan-to-value (LTV) ratio and required reserve ratio (RRR).  
  Let the loan-to-value ratio, b
tV , response to the loan target and asset price
5
, yielding: 
       1 1
ˆˆ ˆ ˆ(1 ) (1 ) ,b b vt v t v q t v l t tV V q l                            (35) 
When the required reserve ratio is used as an instrument of macroprudential policy, it 
responses to the loan target as well as to the rate of inflation, equation (34) is replaced by  
1
ˆ ˆ(1 )( ) (1 ) ( ) ,R y m l cb mt RRR RRR t RRR t RRR RRR t t RRR tRRR y l l RRR
               (36) 
3.5 Government and Fiscal Policy 
China’s government is assumed to adhere to a continuously balanced budget, its budget 
constraint is  
t tG T
                                         
 (37) 
Fiscal policy is implemented by controlling the tax and the government spending.  
3.6 General Equilibriums 
The Aggregate Resources Equilibrium satisfies 
s b E
t t t t t tc c c i G y                                  (38) 
  The government spending is assumed to be given exogenously. 
  Because the interbank borrowings cancel out in the whole market, equation (22) implies 
that the loan market equilibrium satisfies 
         (1 )t t t t tRRR D L RR E                                (39) 
  where tRR  denoted the required reserves.  
3.7 The Process of Shocks 
We simulate the effects of six structural economic shocks.  These are shocks to 
technology, net property, cost, R, RRR and LTV.  The fourth is a monetary policy 
                                                             
4
 See, for example, Glocker and Towbin (2012).  
5
 This is because that, housing prices contain significant useful information about aggregate price movements, 
response of the monetary policy to the asset prices help stabilise macroeconomic stability (Bernanke and Gertler, 1999; 
Cecchetti et al., 2000;), and the volatility in asset prices is a key indicator for the financial stability (Bernanke and Gertler, 
1999; Borio and Lowe, 2002; and so on).  
innovation, and the last two are macroprudential instrument shocks. Most shocks 
(excluding the fourth one) follow AR (1) processes:  
2
, ,
ˆ ˆ , (0, )
iid
t t t t N                              (40) 
Where { ,a ,RRR ,u }t t t t t    
4. Parameters Calibration 
Following Chen et al. (2012), Iacoviello (2005), Glocker and Towbin (2012), Quint and 
Rabanal (2013), Sun and Sen (2011), Sun (2012), and other regarding Chinese literature, 
we calibrate all the parameters in Table 1. 
               Table 1 Calibration of Parameters 
Identification Value Description 
s   
0.99 Discount factor of savers (Patient households) 
b   
0.95 Discount factor of borrowers (Impatient Households) 
E   
0.98 Discount factor of entrepreneurs 
   0.03 Depreciation rate of capital 
NA   
0.1 Coefficient of net property service 
   2.20 Labour supply aversion 
   0.42 Capital share in production 
   0.03 Net property share in production 
   0.70 Patient households wage share 
E   
1.0 Coefficient of entrepreneurs’ property adjustment cost 
b   
1.0 Coefficient of borrowers’ property adjustment cost 
   2.0 Coefficient of capital adjustment cost 
X   1.15 Steady-state gross mark up 
   0.75 Probability fixed price 
EV   0.85 Steady-state loan-to-value entrepreneurs 
bV   0.60 Steady-state loan-to-value borrowers 
dc   
2.0 cost coefficient for deposits 
lc   
1.0 cost coefficient for loans 
ec   
1.0 cost coefficient for excess reserves 
   50 coefficient determining the window guidance for loans  
  
1.01 Inflation coefficient in Taylor rule 
y   0.01 Output gap coefficient in Taylor rule 
r   
0.75 Persistence coefficient of policy rate in Taylor rule 
d
r  
0.7 Persistence coefficient for deposit rule 
l
r   
0.7 Persistence coefficient for loans rule  
cb
l   
0.2 Persistence coefficient for loan target rule 
l
   50 Inflation coefficient in loan target rule 
y
l  
5.0 Output gap coefficient in loan target rule 
R
RR  
0.90 Persistence coefficient of interest rate of required reserves 
R
RRR  
0.6 Persistence coefficient of required reserve ratio rule 
l
RRR  
10.0 Loan coefficient in required reserves ratio rule 
RRR
  5.0 Inflation coefficient in required reserves ratio rule 
y
RRR  
2.0 Output coefficient in required reserves ratio rule 
v   
0.90 Persistence coefficient for loan-to-value ratio 
q   0.75 Asset price coefficient in the loan-to-value rule 
l   
0.87 Loan target coefficient in the loan-to-value rue 
J   
0.85 Persistence coefficient for net property service shocks 
u   
0.75 Persistence coefficient for cost-push shocks 
a   
0.5 Persistence coefficient for technology shocks 
RRR   
0.85 Persistence coefficient for required reserve ratio shocks 
J   
24.89 Standard error of net property service shock 
u   
0.17 S.E of cost-push shock 
a   
1.30 S.E. of technology shock 
RRR   
1 S.E. of required reserve ratio shock 
R   
0.27 S.E. of policy rate shock 
   
  According to equation (3), the steady-state value of deposit rate is calculated by  
1/d sr  ; we set steady-state interest rate on require reserves at 1.009, same as the 
steady-state interest rate on excess reserves. The steady-state for the require reserves ratio 
is set at 10% to match its average level in the Chinese data. The steady-state ratio for 
deposits to output is 0.50; other steady-state values are calculated following Iacoviello 
(2005) and Chen et al. (2012).  
  The discount factor of savers s  is set to 0.99, implying that the annual rate of 
interest in China is 4% (the gross rate is 1.04); so the discount factors of borrowers and 
entrepreneurs are set at 0.95 and 0.98 respectively; China’s annual rate of depreciation is 
about 12%, so the quarterly value of the depreciation  is set to 0.030. Following the 
estimation of Sun Lixin et al. (2011), the labour supply aversion and capital share in 
production take 2.20 and 0.42 respectively.  The coefficients of capital adjustment costs 
follow Iacoviello (2005), and the coefficients of managing deposits and loans are set 
following Chen et al. (2012). The persistence parameters are mainly calibrated following 
the estimation in Sun et al. (2011), and most persistent coefficients of shocks are also 
calibrated following Sun et al. (2011). The standard variances of the shocks and the 
parameters of China’s monetary policy follow Chen et al. (2012) and Sun et al. (2011).  
 
5. Policy Experiments and Empirical Analysis 
5.1 The Policy Experiments 
Following Glocker and Towbin (2012), we assume that the central bank’s objective is to 
minimize an exogenously given loss function. The traditional price stability loss function
6
 
is defined as 
         
2 2ˆ[ ]PS t y tE y                                       (41) 
  where 
y  denotes the policymakers’ subjective weight of output stability, relative to 
price stability. ˆty  denotes the output gap, which is a very important variable to the 
objectives of China’s monetary policy. 
  When the financial stability is added to the objectives of the central bank, the loss 
function is given by  
        2 2 2 2ˆˆ ˆ[ ]PS FS t y t L t q tE y L q   
                           (42) 
  where ˆ ˆ,t tL q  denote the deviations of loans and asset prices from their steady state 
respectively.  
  We design the following 4 policy experiments to assess the effects of monetary policy 
and macroprudential policy and their interdependencies
7
. 
Policy Experiment I: Only Monetary Policy: Interest Rate and Required Reserve 
Ratio are Policy Instruments Respectively 
In which we keep the equation (31)-(34), screening out the effects of macroprudential 
policy。 
                                                             
6
 The reason for choosing this type of loss functions by the central bank can refer to the discussions by Glocker and 
Towbin (2012).  
7
 In designing our policy experiments, we do follow the Tinbergen rule-one instrument for one objective-in monetary 
policy, yet not in macroprudential policy, as stressed by Lim et al. (2011): multiple instruments should be used for 
financial stability.  
Policy Experiment II: Monetary Policy and Macroprudential Policy: Interest Rate 
and Required Reserve Ratio are Monetary Policy Instruments Respectively; 
Loan-to-value ratio is taken as the instrument of Macroprudential Policy. 
In this experiment, besides the monetary policy rules including equation (31)-(34), we 
add a macroprudential policy operation: Loan-to-value rule (equation (35)). 
Policy Experiment III: Monetary Policy and Macroprudential Policy: Interest Rate is 
Monetary Policy Instrument, and Required Reserve Ratio Is Macroprudential Policy 
Instrument. 
In this test, we include equations (31)-(33) for monetary policy, and equation (34) is 
replaced by equation (36) for macroprudential policy.  
Policy Experiment IV: Monetary Policy and Macroprudential Policy: Interest Rate Is 
the Instrument of Monetary Policy, and LTV and RRR Are the Instruments of 
Macroprudential Policy. 
In this experiment, we test the combination effects of monetary policy with equations 
(31)-(33), and of macroprudential policy with equations (35)-(36).  
All the empirical results are presented and discussed in section 5.2. 
 
5.2 Empirical Analysis 
5.2.1 The Effects of Monetary Policy Shocks  
If the PBOC's monetary policy is concerned with price stability, its two instruments are the 
policy rate and required reserve ratio. Figure 9 presents the effects of shocks from policy 
rate. When policy rate increases 27 base points by a positive shock, inflation falls 0.05%, 
the price of assets falls about 2.5% immediately, deposits fall about 10%, output declines 
2.5% after 3 quarters, consumption of households decreases about 0.8%, investment 
doesn’t decrease, so the fall in the output comes from the decrease in households’ 
consumption. 
Figure 9 The Effects of Policy Rate Shocks (Policy rate increases 27 base points) 
 
Figure 10 shows the effects of required reserve ratio shocks. A shock to the required 
reserve ratio raises it about 1%.  This causes asset prices to fall by about 4.8%, and loans 
by 4%, but neither CPI inflation, investment nor output go down. Only household 
consumption drops.  This implies that the required reserve ratio is a poor instrument for 
stabilizing output or the price level, but a good one for stabilizing asset prices and loans, 
and hence has an absolute advantage as a financial stability instrument. 
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             Figure 10 The Effects of Required Reserves Ratio (1% increase) 
 
 
5.2.2 The Effects of Macroprudential Policy Shocks 
The two macroprudential instruments we consider are the required reserve ratio, and the 
loan-to-value ratio (LTV).  The effects of these two types of shocks are shown in Figure 
11 and Figure 12 respectively.  
In Figure 11, a positive LTV shock cuts asset prices and loans sharply, implying that 
LTV is a powerful financial stability instrument.  Furthermore, from Fig 12, we may infer 
that including a required reserve ratio shock enhances monetary stability in our 
experiment suggesting that this macroprudential device can enhance monetary policy. So 
macroprudential policy complements to the monetary policy. 
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Figure 11 the Effects of Loan-to-Value Ratio Shocks 
 
 
Figure 12 shows that the increase in RRR by a positive shock decreases the price of 
assets significantly, reduces the volume of loans a little, and reduces output and CPI 
inflation. So the RRR could be used as either a macroprudential policy instrument or a 
monetary policy instrument.  
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 Figure 12 The Effects of Required Reserve Ratio (RRR) Shocks (RRR as a 
macroprudential instrument) 
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5.2.3 The Comparisons of Price Stability Objective and Financial Stability Objective 
To compare, we set 0.5y l q     . We conduct the following four policy 
experiments: 
Experiment I: No LTV Rule.  Here we suppress equations (35) and (36), and freeze the 
LTV instrument at the steady state values. The RRR is attuned to the monetary policy 
target only. 
Experiment II: As I, but with LTV introduced, and attuned to macroprudential 
objectives. Only equation (36) is suppressed; (35) now applies. 
Experiment III:  As I, but with (36) replacing (34), so the RRR responds to 
macroprudential aims only, and no longer to monetary aims; and the LTV instrument is 
idle. 
Experiment IV: As III, but with LTV reintroduced, and directed to macroprudential 
objective. 
When the PBOC's monetary policy is concerned solely with price stability, the loss 
results are given in Table 2.  
Table 2 the Results under Price Stability Objective (Experiment I) 
 Policy Rate Rule Required Reserve Ratio Rule 
PS   0.000591 0.3141 
 
Table 2 indicates that the policy rate (interest rate) is a better instrument for price 
stability than the required reserve ratio in our Experiment I. 
Table 3 presents the results for Experiment II, III, and IV. 
Table 3 the Results under both Price Stability and Financial Stability Objectives 
 Experiment II Experiment III Experiment IV  
 Monetary Policy Macropru. 
Policy  
Monetary 
Policy 
Macropru. 
Policy 
Monetary 
Policy 
Macropru. 
Policy 
 R* RRR (LTV) R RRR R LTV RRR 
/PS FS   0.00333 0.0451  0.5582  0.1666  0.00615 
FS  45.77 60.37 0.07166 13.73 0.0578 37 0.439 1.17 
/PS FS /
PS  
5.63 0.1435  944  281.9  0.0196 
*R denotes policy rate rule, RRR: required reserve ratio rule, LTV: loan-to-value rule. 
  /PS FS  denotes the loss by price stability policy given financial stability is 
concerned. 
The results of Experiment II show that when the PBOC chooses required reserve ratio 
as its monetary policy instrument and LTV as its macroprudential policy instrument, 
macroprudential and monetary policies are complementary. Otherwise, if the interest rate 
is taken as the instrument of monetary policy, the implementation of macroprudential 
policy increases the wealth loss of price stability, so may conflict with the effects of 
monetary policy. So, as row (6) reveals, pursuing financial stability destabilizes the price 
level. 
  In Experiment III, the policy rate is attuned to price stability (monetary policy) and the 
required reserve ratio is chosen for financial stability (macroprudential policy). The loss 
results show that the required reserve ratio is a better choice of the macroprudential policy 
instruments, but the macroprudential policy operation enhances the loss in price stability. 
This portrays macroprudential and monetary policy in conflict.  
  In Experiment IV, monetary policy relies on the interest rate, and macroprudential the 
LTV. RRR is deployed for both purposes; and conflict again appears 
  On the basis of the above results, our suggestions for policy combination are: 
 When the PBOC aims solely at price stability, the interest rate is a better choice for 
the implementation of monetary policy than the required reserve ratio. 
 If the PBOC is responsible for both the price stability and financial stability, the better 
combination of policy instruments is: required reserve ratio for monetary policy and 
the loan-to-value ratio for macroprudential policy. Or 
 The required reserve ratio is taken as the tool for both monetary and macroprudential 
policies, while the loan-to-value ratio is chosen as the instrument for the 
macroprudential policy. 
The latter two suggestions ensure that the macroprudential policy complements the 
monetary policy.  
 
5.2.4 The Effects of Other Shocks 
We now consider the other three disturbances: a technology shock, a cost-push shock and 
a net asset shock. The effects of these shocks are presented in Figure 13, 14, and 15 
respectively. 
 
 
Figure 13 the Effects of Technology Shocks 
 
  A positive shock to technology increases consumption, investment and thereby 
increasing output and property; the jump in technology reduces rates of interest rate and 
inflation, and stimulates the output. (Figure 13) 
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               Figure 14 the Effects of Cost-Push Shocks 
 
   
Figure 14 shows that a positive cost-push raises rates of inflation and interest, and thus 
lowers the investment and output. 
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Figure 15 the Effects of Net Asset Shocks 
 
  In Figure 15, a property service shock causes a rise in the price of asset, reducing 
consumption; the rise in the price of assets increases investment and hence output.  
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
Using a DSGE model featuring China’s unique monetary policy and financial regulations, 
we analyse the interactions between monetary and macroprudential policies in China. Our 
policy experiments show that monetary policy and macroprudential policy could be either 
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complements or substitutes in China, which depends on the choices of instruments for two 
policies. 
  If price stability is the sole objective of the PBOC, our analysis suggests that policy rate 
is a better tool than the required reserve ratio. If the PBOC are required to target both price 
stability and financial stability, our empirical results suggest that the PBOC should prefer 
RRR as its monetary instrument and LTV as its macroprudential instrument.  Alternatively, 
it should employ the RRR for both aims, with LTV da solely macroprudential tool. These 
policy combinations can achieve the two objectives of price stability and financial stability 
simultaneously.  
  Globally, the framework of macroprudential policy is still under exploration, a sound 
policy combination for price stability and financial stability in China also need more study 
and empirical examinations.  
 
 
References 
Agénor, P.-R., K. Alper, and L. Pereira da Silva (2012), “Capital Requirements and 
Business Cycles with Credit Market Imperfections”, Accepted Manuscript, Journal of 
Macroeconomics.  
Angelini, Paolo, Stefano Neri and Fabio Panetta (2011), “Monetary and Macroprodential 
Policies”, Working Paper No. 801m Bank of Italia. 
Beau, Denis, Laurent Clerc and Beno Mojon (2011), “Macro-prudential Policy and the 
Conduct of Monetary Policy”, Bank of France, 2011. 
Bernanke, B. S., M. Gertler and S. Gilchrist (1999) “The Financial Accelerator in a 
Quantitative Business Cycle Framework”, in J. B. Taylor and M. Woodford, eds., 
Handbook of macroeconomics, Vol. 1C. Amsterdam: Elsevier Science, North–Holland, 
pp. 1341-1393. 
Bernanke, B. and Mark Gertler (1999), “Monetary Policy and Asset Price Volatility,” 
Economic Review, Fourth Quarterly, pp17-51.  
Borio, C. (2010), “Implementing a Macroprudential Framework: Blending Boldness and 
Realism,” Bank for International Settlements. 
Borio, C. and I. Shim (2007), “What Can (Macro-) Prudential Policy Do to Support 
Monetary Policy?,” BIS Working Papers No. 242. 
Borio C and Philip Lowe (2002), “Asset Prices, Financial and Monetary Stability: 
Exploring the Nexus.” BIS Working Paper No.114, 2002. 
Cecchetti, Stephen G. , Hans Genberg, John Lipsky, and Sushil Wadhwani (2000), “Asset 
Prices and Central Bank Policy”, The Geneva Report on the World Economy No. 2.  
Chadha, J. G. and Luisa Corrado (2011), “Macroprudential Policy on Liquidity-What does 
a DSGE Model tell us?” CEIS RESEARCH PAPER SERIES,Vol. 9, Issue 5, No. 193. 
Chen, Lifeng (2013), “Housing Price Volatility under Homing Purchase Restriction 
Shocks，Demand Control and the Macro-prudential Policy”, Reports of Guizhou 
University of Finance and Economics, Vol.4, 2013. 
Chen, Qianying, Michael Funke and Michael Paetz (2012), “Market and non-market 
monetary policy tools in a calibrated DSGE model for mainland China”, BOFIT 
Discussion Papers 16, Bank of Finland, BOFIT. 
Cúrdia, V. and M. Woodford (2010), “Credit Spreads and Monetary Policy”, Journal of 
Money Credit and Banking,Volume 42, Issue S1, p. 3-35. 
Funke, Michael and Michael Paetz (2012), “A DSGE-based assessment of nonlinear 
loan-to-Value policies: Evidence from Hong Kong”, BOFIT Discussion Papers 11, 
Bank of Finland, BOFIT.  
Funke, Michael and Michael Paetz (2012), “Financial system reforms and China’s 
monetary policy framework: A DSGE-based assessment of initiatives and proposals”, 
BOFIT Discussion Papers 30, Bank of Finland, BOFIT. 
Galati, G. and R. Moessner (2011), “Macroprudential Policy—A Literature Review,” BIS 
Working Papers No. 337. 
Gerali, A., Stefano Neri, Luca Sessa and F. M. Signoretti (2010), “Credit and Banking in a 
DSGE Model of Euro Area”, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Supplement to 
Vol. 42, No. 6, p107-141. 
Glocker, Christian and Pascal Towbin (2012), “Reserve Requirements for Price and 
Financial Stability: When Are They Effective?”, International Journal of Central 
Banking, Vol. 8, No. 1, pp65-113. 
Iacoviello, Mattero (2005), “Housing Prices, Borrowing Constraints, and Monetary Policy 
in the Business Cycle”, the American Economic Review, Vol.95, No. 3, pp739-764. 
International Monetary Fund, 2011a, “Macroprudential Policy: An Organizing 
Framework.” 
_____(2011b), “Towards Effective Macroprudential Policy Frameworks: An Assessment 
of  Stylized Institutional Models” (companion board paper), forthcoming. 
Kannan, P., P. Rabanal and A. Scott (2009), “Monetary and Macroprudential Policy 
Rules in a Model with House Price Booms”, IMF Working Paper No. 251. 
Lim C., F. Columba, A. Costa, P. Kongsamut, A. Otani, M. Saiyid, T. Wezel, and X. Wu 
(2011), “Macroprudential Policy: What Instruments and How to Use Them”, IMF 
Working Paper WP/11/238. 
Ma, Yong and Chen Yulu (2013), “The Coordination and Matching of Macroprudential 
Policy-Simulation Based on China”, Financial Research, No.8, 2013, pp57-69. 
Pari`es, Matthieu Darracq, Christoffer Kok Sørensen, and Diego Rodriguez-Palenzuela 
(2011), “Macroeconomic Propagation under Different Regulatory Regimes: Evidence 
from an Estimated DSGE Model for the Euro Area”, International Journal of Central 
Banking, Vol. 7 No. 4, pp49-113.  
Quint, Dominic and Pau Rabanal (2013), “Monetary and Macroprudential Policy in an 
Estimated DSGE Model of the Euro Area”, IMF Working Paper, WP/13/209.  
Stein, J. C. (2012), “Monetary Policy as Financial Stability Regulation” The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, pp1–39. 
Sun, Lixin and Somnath Sen (2011), “Monetary Policy Rules and the Business Cycle in 
China-Bayesian DSGE Model simulation”, SSRN Working Paper. 
Sun, Lixin (2013), “Global Financial Crisis, China's Macroeconomic Policies and the 
Fluctuations of China's Economy”, SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2303995. 
Woodford, M. (2010), “Inflation Targeting and Financial Stability”, a presentation at the 
Conference “The Future of Monetary Policy” EIEF, Rome, Sept. 30-Oct. 1, 2010. 
 
